Further, it is difficult to understand why Neanderthal man, with the brain potential equal to that of *H. sapiens sapiens*, would not have had the functional capacity of speech. Since we cannot now examine the neuroanatomical structures for speech in Neanderthal man (defined as he has been through his classical morphological characteristics), it appears to me we have little evidence and even less reason for excluding him from the *H. sapiens* taxonomy.

Though in some respects it does seem "a priori and biologically absurd," as Porshnev states, that (as some would explain the problem) "all *Paleanthropus* forms died out or were assimilated almost immediately . . . after the appearance of *H. sapiens*," it is no more so than the "unusually fast tempo of this evolutionary progress [of speech development which] indicates a mechanism of selection somewhat akin to artificial selection" posed by Porshnev. If *natura non facit saltum* (to quote Darwin) applies to the former idea, it applies equally well to the latter.

Reply

by Dmitri Bayanov and Igor Bourtsev

Moscow, U.S.S.R. 15 vii 74

We are grateful to Sol Tax for acquainting CA readers with Porshnev's anthropological ideas and for giving us the opportunity to discuss them here. The vastness of the problems embraced by the Porshnev theory, its (in our opinion) truly revolutionary character, and the fact of its presentation for discussion in an overly summarized form make many queries on the part of the reader inevitable. Besides, as we see from the comments, Porshnev's works are not known to those who kindly agreed to take part in the discussion. Therefore we would like to provide an explanation of our late colleague's theory before answering concrete questions and comments offered by his critics.

There are two cardinal notions in anthropology on whose mutual relation the very essence of this science depends: man and animal. In pre-Darwinian times the relation between these notions was of one kind, in post-Darwinian times of another, and the changeover from one to the other signified an unprecedented revolution in man's thought and world outlook. Before Darwin, a supernatural schism divided animal and man; after Darwin, we accept a natural affinity and transition between one and the other. But the more science tries to solve the riddles of this transition, and the deeper in time it looks for minute details of it, the less distinct the notions of man and animal become, so that one is left with the question, "Transition from what to what?" To understand the origin of man, we have to know exactly what he is, and to know that we have to understand his origin.

Porshnev offered to break this vicious circle by restoring and reemphasizing the difference between the notions of man and animal, but this time on a scientific basis. In fact, his theory is a colossal attempt to stress and define the uniqueness of man in the light of modern science.

Science consists of facts and their interpretation. America is a fact of geography; Columbus's taking it for India is a famous example of interpretation. Let us state from the outset that Porshnev never quarreled with facts, but he was up against some very sacred interpretations.

How could science possibly go awry in interpreting facts of paleoanthropology? First of all, by uncritically using the ready-made, unscientific, pre-Darwinian, intuitive concept of man in the study of fossil material. When skeletal remains were found that looked more manlike than apelike, scholars, without much further thought, started labeling them "man." Thus such terms as Java man, Peking man, and Neanderthal man came into usage. Using a familiar name for an unknown thing, one inevitably imagines that unknown entity in terms of the makeup of the familiar one of the same name. In other words, images of ourselves were projected into the unfathomed past, and once placed there they began to be treated as facts of prehistory.

Another possible cause of misinterpretation in paleoanthropology is the fact that this science is manned by osteologists, who know everything about skulls and very little about their contents, while it is the latter and not the former that have anything to do with the life of all brainy creatures.

A third cause is the fact that modern evolutionary anthropology was born in Western Europe, and the closest living animal relatives of man known to the European scientist were representatives of the Pongidae. The evolutionist's thought could have taken a somewhat different direction had he set his eyes on a *Troglodytes recens.*

The sacred interpretations challenged by Porshnev are (1) that primate bipedalism is sufficient for human status; (2) that any of the pre-*sapiens* higher primates were big-game hunters; (3) that certain primates' tool-making activity and use of fire are sufficient evidence of their human intellects; and (4) that any of the pre-*sapiens* primates had speech and abstract thinking. All of this adds up to his denial that man descends directly from the ape.

Between ape and man Porshnev places a whole zoological family of higher bipedal primates: the Troglodytidae. In his view, instead of primitive man and developing man there was an extremely developed animal, an animal of the highest possible order, which at a certain point of evolution became man—*Homo sapiens*, the only species of man in existence. We don't know what will become of man in the future, but so far he is the only model of this type of "production."

To illustrate this phylogenetic point with an example from ontogenesis, let us note that there is no such thing as a primitive butterfly. It's either a butterfly, or a pupa, or a caterpillar, yet these vastly different things are intimately connected by their origin.

Borrowing a simile from a more topical realm of present-day reality, we could also liken the origin of man to a space shot. It was a multistage rocket of evolution that put humans into orbit, and the rocket went faster and faster, but no matter how high the stages got it was only those of our ancestors who were actually in orbit who can be called human beings, according to the Porshnev theory.

True, in the final phases of their steeply rising evolutionary curve the animals become very strange and unusual and deserve a place of their own in biology and philosophy. The old Aristotelian problems of the actual and the potential of these borderline cases are somewhat similar to those confronting the biologist in some fungi which "behave" sometimes as animals and sometimes as plants or in viruses which display characteristics of both animate and inanimate objects or those facing the physicist studying "liquid crystals." Yet, according to Porshnev, on the basis of what we know at present, our unusual creatures in their usual state have to be classed beyond the pale of man. Compared with such common beings as, say, cats and dogs, anthropoids are very strange animals indeed, more manlike than doglike. And even compared with apes, Porshnev's troglodytes are very unusual animals, more manlike than apelike. But this still doesn't make them men.

Nobody ever raises an eyebrow over the fact that such different things as, say, the amoeba and the gorilla belong in the same world and are called by the same name, "animal." If the animal world encompasses things as different as this, how can we know where it should end? Why couldn't Nature have created animals even more developed than apes? Who has proved that the anthropoid is the last word

of zoological evolution? Who can say to Nature, "Here and no more. This is the limit of thy power"?

In fact, there must be a limit to the animal kingdom and a boundary between man and beast, but is it not reasonable to assume that life moves on to a new stage of creativity only after it has fully displayed its talent in the old one?

What about tool making and the use of fire by our primate ancestors? Doesn't this prove beyond all doubt their human intelligence? Well, do the beaver's dams or the squirrel's storing of food for a "rainy day" signify their human intelligence? Extrapolation in biology from similar effects to similar causes is very risky. Similar functions may and do appear at very dissimilar levels of biological organization.

Still, persists the critic, there is no phylogenetic connection between the squirrel's or the beaver's activity, on the one hand, and man's activity, on the other, while there is every reason to believe that *H. sapiens* inherited tool making from his pre-*sapiens* ancestors. Doesn't this show that the squirrel-and-beaver argument is irrelevant here? Not quite. To make the point clearer, let us take a function man shares with animals and inherited directly from them, sexual reproduction. Can we infer from the obvious similarity of this function in man and animal their similar intelligence? Is it not more reasonable to assume that an animal engaged in propagation doesn't really know what it is doing? This example shows that even in phylogeny a function can first be devoid of sense and later acquire it.

We agree that Porshnev's theory sounds very strange at first hearing. How did he arrive at such unorthodox ideas, and is there more justification for them?

Boris Porshnev was a man of encyclopedic erudition and interests. Besides his main subjects of history and philosophy, he actively worked in and published papers on psychology, sociology, and archeology. Taking part in archeological and paleontological expeditions, he not only looked for facts but also searched out threads of logic to connect them. This is normal practice for the theoretician and has nothing to do with bias. The mere empiricist can't see the woods for the trees, whereas the creative theoretician soars on high and take a bird's-eye view of the forest of facts below.

History and philosophy taught Porshnev to look for trends and tendencies in processes of historic dimensions. They also taught him to take account of the immense diversity of causes and effects and their interactions in evolution, thus whetting his interest in problems of ecology. Here he had a worthy forerunner, Academician Pyotr Sushkin (1868–1928), also a scholar of diverse interests and great erudition. In an article published in 1928, Sushkin stressed the necessity to take ecology into account in solving the problem of man's origin: "I . . . strive to see emerging man not in isolation but as an element of certain fauna which is part of the environment and its changes."

Ecology combines the concreteness of the natural sciences with the broad outlook of philosophy; in fact, in its broad-mindedness ecology is second only to genuine philosophy, and therefore it was not by chance that Porshnev found an ecological approach to the problem of man's origin most appropriate.

To be exact, Porshnev applied the ecological approach not to the study of the origin of man per se (in his classification), but to the origin and development of that zoological stage of evolution which directly precedes man and paves the way for his emergence, i.e., the origin and development of the Troglodytidae. Let us briefly trace his train of thought, sometimes expanding upon what he left in parentheses and making explicit what he implied.

Fact: abundance of splintered animal bones found in association with hominid (Troglodytidae) fossils. Orthodox interpretation: hominids were hunters, killing various animals (including some very big ones), eating their flesh, and crushing their bones for marrow. Porshnev's interpretation: early Troglodytidae were "bone hunters," collecting the leavings of predators' feasts. As is known, carnivores with their stomachs full are no threat even to the meekest of animals. Besides, Troglodytidae stole bones in broad daylight, while predators are most active and dangerous at night.

When the anthropoid ape found himself on the ground and in the savanna as a result of ecological changes in the Tertiary period, he suffered a decrease in food supply from what he had enjoyed in the forest; hence his search for dietary substitutes. Because of his morphology, he could not consume grass the way herbivores do, nor could he feed on herbivores the way carnivores do. But he had hands formed in the forest, and it didn't take him long to put this biological preadaptation to good use. Abundant bones, especially skulls, of savanna-dwelling animals were like shells and nuts which the ape knew how to crush with stones. The only problem was to bring bones and stones together.

Thus bone-carrying and -crushing was the main factor of selection which made the anthropoid ape bipedal and marked the beginning of the Troglodytidae as such. In this respect, Porshnev's theory closely coincides with Hewes's (1961) food-transport hypothesis, the only difference being that the former suggests scavenged bones as the objects carried by would-be bipedal primates while the latter suggested scavenged meat. Writes Hewes (1961:687): "DuBrul (1958:90) notes that upright posture is essentially a 'reduction of the repetition of structures serving the same function,' with the forelimbs becoming 'as it were, accessory mandibles rather than locomotor devices,' leading to a 'new mode of feeding and feeding niche.'"

Indeed, the troglodyte's hands became mighty accessory mandibles, with ever replaceable teeth of stone, which could crush bones of such strength and in such numbers as were beyond the power of all other scavengers, including the hyenas. This bone-cracking, brain- and marrow-eating stage in the evolution of the Troglodytidae, which we may call a stage of cerebro-and-myelophagia, must have lasted at least a couple of million years.

As a result of this million-year-long process, the ground-dwelling higher primates not only became bipedal, but also got the knack of using stones to provide for their livelihood. A million-year-long application of stones to skeletons taught the troglodytes that stones were good not only for cracking bones, but also for cutting and mincing meat that remained on some bones they collected. They also learned in the process that only sharp stones, appearing as a by-product of bone smashing, are good for meat cutting. Thus the next and most important phase in the process was their hunting for skeletal remains with ever more meat on the bones and eventually for whole carcasses, on one hand, and their systematic making of sharp stones, on the other. Such a reconstruction of events makes comprehensible how bipedal primates came to apply hard objects (stones) to soft material (meat), which otherwise seems a stroke of genius.

Another, and ultimately the most important, "by-product" of the process was the unusually swiftly growing brain of our bipedal scavengers. What were the causes of natural selection of the brainiest in this case? The answer is probably provided by realization that the troglodyte had not one but several rather demanding tasks on his mind during each feeding cycle: (1) to watch the herbivores, (2) to watch the carnivores, (3) to look for results of their interaction, (4) to be in the right place at the right time

to find an adequate carrion supply, (5) to outfox and outmanoeuvre carnivore enemies and competitors in getting away with it, and (6) to solve the problem of consumption with the ever present handicap of inadequate teeth through finding and later fashioning "artificial teeth."

Thus the Troglodytidae became the brainiest creatures on earth prior to *H. sapiens*. For our theme, however, it is important to emphasize that in the broad context of evolution their intelligence was the result and not the cause of their way of life. And, according to Porshnev, their intelligence was still of an animal kind, still insufficient to classify them as humans.

What about fire? Isn't its use a clear and indisputable proof of the user's human status? No, it isn't, said Porshnev, the first scholar ever to utter such heresy. According to him, the use of fire was no invention by a pre-*sapiens* genius, but a natural and inevitable consequence of stone-tool production—a by-product again, if you wish. If bipedalism was the consequence of carrying and cracking bones, then the use of fire was the consequence of fashioning stones. Red-hot splinters produced by hammering one piece of flint with another were bound to make smouldering a common occurrence at the litter-strewn sites of our bipedal primate ancestors. Porshnev thought that for an unknown length of time troglodytes were a sort of firemen, extinguishing the nasty patches of smouldering with their broad hands and feet. By and by they got used to this nuisance and learned to turn it into flames and keep it going. If man can teach an anthropoid to smoke cigars and drive an automobile, then Nature, the greatest instructor of all, could have taught bipedal hominoids some tricky things too. Thus, according to Porshnev's logic, it seems not so much that bipedal primates adapted fire as that they became adapted to it.

To sum up, the Troglodytidae's making of tools and use of fire were more the result of their ecology than of their psychology, whereas with *H. sapiens* it was the other way around. This needs to be stated to show not only Porshnev's understanding of the events preceding the appearance of *H. sapiens*, but also his idea of the subsequent divergence of man and the Troglodytidae. Since the tool-making activity of the Troglodytidae was mainly stimulated by ecology, they were bound to lose it with a sufficient change in the environment. And, conversely, since such activity of *H. sapiens* was deeply rooted in his intelligence, he went on developing it despite the environment. Thus the troglodytes and *H. sapiens* headed in opposite directions: the first slipped back to the tool-less and fire-less life of other animals; the second marched on to ever new vistas of technological innovation.

Now we come to the crucial question of the whole theory: How and why did *H. sapiens* come into being? According to Porshnev, the appearance of *H. sapiens* is connected with the formation in the brain of the second signal system (Ivan Pavlov's term), which makes speech and conceptual thought possible. The second signal system emerged, Porshnev thought, not as a result of the primates' work with any inanimate objects (such as stone tools, for example), but as a result of their intergroup relations, of activities directed at each other. The suggested mechanism of such interaction is described in detail by him in a work which is due to be published posthumously in a few months.

Certainly, Porshnev was not the first thinker to believe that the power of speech is the true mark of man, but he was the first to think it appeared so suddenly and so late in anthropogenesis. The event can be compared to an atom bomb explosion. Just as a critical mass of uranium is needed to produce such an explosion, so a certain critical amount of brain of a certain complexity is required to make speech and abstract thinking possible. Therefore Porshnev denied the possibility of any rudimentary, inarticulate, and primitive speech prior to this postulated "verbal explosion."

To test this heretical theory, we have to find out whether Neanderthals have the power of speech or not. We'll say more on this issue below, but, assuming for the moment that Porshnev is right and all the pre-*sapiens* primates were truly devoid of language, what status—human or animal—are we going to grant to Neanderthals? For our part, we'd rather accept a species or genus of tool-making and fire-using animals than a species or genus of speechless humans.

Poirier asks what is meant by "the present crisis in current ideas on the evolution of the higher primates." As we understand it, the crisis is evident from the following:

1. The more facts are obtained (to wit, the Leakeys' discoveries), the less clear the overall picture of man's origin becomes from the viewpoint of the orthodox version.

2. The more fossil forms are found, the more insistent becomes the unspoken question of what made the whole stage of primate evolution between the apes and *H. sapiens* so promptly extinct. While paleontologists hotly debate the question "What did in the dinosaurs?", paleoprimatologists keep silence about the immeasurably more relevant question of higher-primate extinction.

3. Orthodox primatology has not recognized and, apparently, has no clues for analyzing the evidence of the continued existence on earth of higher primate forms distinct from both the Pongidae and *H. sapiens*. Such a turn of events is completely inconsistent with the orthodox version and therefore is quietly ignored.

What is the "mutually independent evidence that has made it possible to establish the existence of this relict species"? A detailed answer is provided in Porshnev's (1968*b*) work "*Borba Za Troglodytov*" (The Struggle for Troglodytes), which is now available in a French translation (Heuvelmans and Porshnev 1974). Here we list the categories of independent evidence as the matter stands at present:

1. Mention, description, and/or drawings of what Porshnev, following Linnaeus, calls troglodytes (or relict hominoids; i.e., higher bipedal primates different from *H. sapiens*) in accounts of ancient or medieval travelers, in natural-history books, medical books, etc.

2. Mention or description in ancient or medieval poetry, art, folklore, demonology.

3. Sightings by modern outdoorsmen.

4. Photographs and plaster casts of footprints.

5. The Patterson film, which at last makes the creature's photographic appearance and movements available to everybody's eyes.

As an example of the first category, we can cite Nizami al-Arudi, who says in his *Chahar maqala* (c. 1150–60, quoted in Bernheimer 1952:190): "The highest animal is the Nasnas, a creature inhabiting the plains of Turkestan, of erect carriage and vertical stature, with wide, flat nails. . . . This, after mankind, is the highest of animals, in as much as in several respects it resembles man: first in its erect stature, secondly in the breadth of its nails, and third in the hair on its head." Also in this category is the fact, strangely overlooked, that modern anthropology bears in its very heart an indirect mark of the troglodytes. It is generally believed that the central term of modern anthropology—*H. sapiens*—was coined to distinguish modern man from the forms we know from the fossil record. Nothing of the sort. The term was introduced by Linnaeus in the 18th century, 100 years before the Darwin theory and systematic studies of hominid fossils. Linnaeus had information about the existence of another kind of "man," hairy, mute, non-sapient, and for the sake of contrast with it he designated our species "*sapiens*."

Examples in categories 2 and 3 are legion. As for

categories 4 and 5, we have studied the photographs and plaster casts of footprints ascribed to relict hominoids, on the one hand, and the Patterson film (made available to us by René Dahinden, to whom we express our gratitude), on the other. In the latter examination, biomechanicist Dr. Dmitri Donskoy also took part, supplementing our analysis with his conclusions (Hunter with Dahinden 1973: 189–92). We have established five solid correlations between the footprints and the creature seen walking in the Patterson film, all five distinct from or totally nonexistent in *sapiens* characteristics. This leaves no doubt in our minds whatsoever that both the film and the footprints we studied are genuine.

Poirier wonders about the "planned acquisition of a specimen, living or dead," of the so-called relic *Paleanthropus*. According to the theory expounded here, man is a unique offspring of a unique family. One potent proof of man's unsurpassed originality is the fact that he decided and managed to reach the moon prior to meeting and officially recognizing his unique animal cousins on earth. As to the whys and hows of this fantastic situation, see Green (1968, 1970, 1973), Hunter with Dahinden (1973), Heuvelmans and Porshnev (1974), Krantz (1971, 1972), and Sanderson (1961).

What is "negative adaptiveness"? By this term Porshnev meant that after *H. sapiens* and the troglodytes had diverged and the former got the upper hand, the latter had to adapt themselves to the conditions and environments the former found negative. For example, *H. sapiens* prefers daylight; troglodytes had to be active at night (hence Linnaeus [1758] defines *H. sapiens* as "*diurnus*" and *H. troglodytes* as "*nocturnus*"). Again, *H. sapiens* prefers fertile plains; troglodytes had to settle in high mountains, deserts, dense forests, and swamps.

Malik argues that "the concept of automatic imitation of implements makes our ideas about cultural tradition and change absurd." This is argumentum ad hominem, and as such of no use in science. Many things in science first seemed right, then absurd, and vice versa. Porshnev objected to the application of the term "culture" or "cultural tradition" to pre-*sapiens* forms, but he never denied change in their tools or tool making. If these forms themselves changed morphologically, why shouldn't their "exosomatic organs" have changed? Porshnev also argued that these "ethological organs" could change somewhat faster than the morphology of their owners. From the viewpoint of Porshnev's theory, the right use of the term "culture" is seen from the following example: Dances of *H. sapiens* are an element of culture and are studied by ethnography; dances of the chimpanzee are an element of zoology and are studied by ethnology.

In response to Raemsch: As is known, size alone cannot be the criterion of a brain's function: both size and structure should be taken into account. Though equal to the *sapiens* brain in size, the Neanderthal brain is different from it, especially in its underdeveloped frontal lobes. (This is apparent from a look at a Neanderthal frontal bone.)

Among other considerations, Porshnev based his belief that Neanderthals were speechless on the study of their morphology, on the one hand, and on the data of *sapiens* brain pathology resulting in aphasia, on the other. He also mentioned the following consideration: no drawings of any identifiable objects made by Neanderthals are known to science. As far as we know, such drawings appear only with the advent of *H. sapiens*. A drawing is a definite sign of abstraction, just as words of a language are. Therefore, the absence of Neanderthal fine art indicates indirectly an absence of language.

That the emergence of language in anthropogenesis was rather sudden seems probable from the following: Though man's physical tools at present include everything from stone axes to earth satellites, we don't find any comparable gradation in his mental tools, i.e., languages. "Nowhere in the world has there been discovered a language that can validly and meaningfully be called 'primitive' " (Hockett 1960:89).

Raemsch holds that "we cannot now examine the neuroanatomical structures for speech in Neanderthal man." Let us answer by quoting from a newspaper account sent to us by our Canadian colleague René Dahinden (Agnew 1971):

> The vocal tract of Neanderthal Man—who lived some 40,000 to 70,000 years ago—lacked most of the pharynx and was capable of producing only "inefficient and monkey-like" sounds, according to researchers from Yale and the University of Connecticut.
>
> They undertook studies of the vocal system of Neanderthal Man for the National Institute of Dental Research after noticing that some mongoloid children who do not talk have heads with an infantile shape. Internally, Neanderthal skulls have similar shapes, they found. . . .
>
> The researchers also found that Neanderthal Man had a voice box high in the throat—a condition present in apes, monkeys and human infants—that made it possible for him to breathe and swallow simultaneously without choking.
>
> This capability is lost in the modern adult human when his vocal tract becomes a sophisticated structure linking larynx, pharynx and mouth with complex neurological controls.
>
> The researchers suggested that Neanderthal Man may have disappeared because of his speech deficiency. . . .
>
> "We may speculate on the disappearance of Neanderthal Man, and we can note that his successors—for example, Cro-Magnon Man—had the skeletal structure that is typical of man's speech mechanism," they added.
>
> "Neanderthal Man's disappearance may have been a consequence of his linguistic—hence, intellectual—deficiencies. . . . in short, we can conclude that man is human because he can say so."

We hasten to add that in Porshnev's opinion Neanderthal's muteness accounts for his disappearance from the tool-working record only; he never disappeared from life itself. If Porshnev is right, we should still have a chance to examine the neuroanatomical structures for speech (or lack of it) in Neanderthals in vivo.

We share Blumenberg's warm feelings for the chimpanzee, and we love other animals which vocalize even less than chimpanzees. What if the baboon could learn the equivalent of 50 or 25 words in the use of plastic objects? Should he be "sunk in the genus *Homo*" too?

We think that to compare man and animal in terms of their communication abilities we should first of all examine their natural communication systems and not such artificial things as Yerkish. There are many points on which man's speech and the communication systems of animals coincide, but there are others on which they are as far apart as heaven and earth. By the communication means at their disposal, animals can greet, warn, threaten, frighten, order, tease, invite, entice, deceive, ask for, beg, give consent, and show indifference, surprise, bewilderment, respect, contempt, contentment. A bee through her dances can indicate to her sisters the direction and distance to nectar-laden flowers, which the instructed bees don't fail to find. Thus both animals and humans do use symbols to influence their counterparts' behavior in their respective kingdoms. But what animals can't do, what is the sole prerogative of man, is to engage in a symbolic give-and-take which we happen to be performing right now and which is called discussion. Animals can "argue" with paws and claws, but not with symbols. To be fair to the chimpanzee, we must at least ask his opinion before plunging him into our excessively vocal genus. If Blumenberg can produce a chimp which can argue the point, be it in Yerkish and within 100 words, we will promptly capitulate.

In reply to Aguirre: Porshnev mostly referred to points and practices of taxonomy accepted by the majority of Soviet anthropologists at the time of the writing of his article. As for his estimate of the number of generations, he didn't mean that the whole of the Lower Paleolithic lasted 1,000 generations, but only that it took about 1,000 generations for stone tools to change slightly in the Lower Paleolithic and 200 generations for slight changes in the Middle Paleolithic.

Touching on the problem of continuity in evolutionary and historical processes, we can say that Porshnev proceeded from the thesis that in evolution and history slow processes of quantitative change alternate with sudden and stormy processes of qualitative change—in other words, that there is no evolution without revolution.

Aguirre says, "Let us look for a specimen, alive or dead, of an infra-man, but let us not classify it before we find it." Well, you can't even start looking for something before you have some idea what you are going to look for. It was precisely the development of such ideas on the issue that led Porshnev to the taxonomy described in the article under discussion, which can be helpful both for the mounting and conduct of the search.

As for the possible racist connotations referred to by Aguirre, it was Porshnev's opinion that, on the contrary, current recognition of lower and higher forms of humanity, such as *H. erectus*, *H. neanderthalensis*, and *H. sapiens*, constitutes a potential basis for racism. Porshnev's insistence that there is and has always been just one species of humans—*H. sapiens*—leaves no room for racism even in prehistory.

In conclusion, we want to thank all the participants in the discussion and hope that they will read Porshnev's article once again to see the depth and breadth of his theory.

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Wanted

■ Correspondence with someone who would like a subscription to *Arqueología y Sociedad* (a journal of Peruvian and South American archaeology and ethnology published by the Museo de Arqueología y Etnología, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima) or some other local journal in exchange for a subscription to CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY. I am prepared to send a list of possible periodicals to any interested person. Please write: Gustavo von Bischoffshausen Henriod, Malecón Cisneros 550, Miraflores, Lima, Perú.

■ Information on the heat treatment of wood ("fire-hardening") during implement manufacture, especially indigenous heat treatment of wooden arrow points, spear points, and digging stick points and the use of heat to straighten shafts. References to the ethnographic or archaeological literature would also be greatly appreciated. Please write: Payson D. Sheets, Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. 80302, U.S.A.

■ For guidance in planning a reform of German orthography, comment from foreigners who read or write German fluently as to the use of majuscules for nouns: is it useful in picking up the sense of the sentence or not? Please write: Johann Knobloch, 53 Bonn, Venusbergweg 34, Federal Republic of Germany.

■ For a monograph on blood groups and other genetic polymorphisms in Jewish populations, offprints of all dates and bibliographic references, especially from 1971 onwards. Please write: A. E. Mourant, Serological Population Genetics Laboratory, St. Bartholomew's Hospital, West Smithfield, London, E.C.1, England.